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T he Institute of Medicine (IOM) has highlighted patient safetyas an urgent health care quality problem,1,2 estimating that44 000 to 98 000 Americans die annually from prevent-
able medical errors,1,3 and more recent estimates are even higher.4
Safety concerns within clinical oncology are at least as complex as
they are in other fields. Herein, we apply concepts from Normal
Accident Theory (NAT),5 a framework for analyzing failure poten-
tial within and between systems, to the practice of clinical oncol-
ogy with the goal of identifying areas of safety concern. Specifi-
cally, we analyze linear vs interactive complexity and tight vs loose
coupling to identify areas for potential safety improvement. In ad-
dition, we demonstrate how we have already applied the findings
of these analyses to improve safety in clinical oncology practice at
the University of North Carolina (UNC).
Safety Concerns Within Clinical Oncology
The medication error rate in the outpatient chemotherapy setting
has been reported to be approximately 3% to 19%,6,7 depending on
the specific practice setting. In a survey of adult outpatients receiv-
ing chemotherapy, 42 (22%) of 193 believed that they had experi-
enced unsafe care.8 A survey of 1013 health care professionals from
9 oncology departments in Switzerland9 reported that 54% ob-
served their colleagues making potentially harmful errors. Seventy
percent reported sometimes remaining silent about safety con-
cerns, and 37% reported remaining silent when they could have
helped prevent an incident. The same research group10 surveyed pa-
tients and found that 16% reported experiencing an error in their
care, and 11% were very concerned about the errors.10
Radiotherapy-associated errors were noted to occur in about
1% to 4% of patient treatments in single-institution reports, with
most errors being not clinically serious.11 Registry data note a much
lower error rate (about 1 to 4 in 10 000) because only a small frac-
tion of errors cross the threshold triggering reporting.11 In a survey
of radiation therapists, 16% reported being personally repri-
manded for raising concerns about safety.12
These data are concerning both for the prevalence of safety
issues and the apparent “suppression” of reporting them. National pro-
fessional societies have recognized these issues, published white pa-
pers to describe best practices, and hold annual safety meetings. For
example, the American Society of Clinical Oncology/Oncology Nurs-
ing Society has guidelines for chemotherapy administration and con-
venes a yearly Quality Care Symposium,13 and the American Society of
TherapeuticRadiationOncologyandtheAmericanAssociationofPhysi-
cists in Medicine have published numerous quality and safety
reports14-18 and have held several safety-focused meetings.
We applaud these efforts and support continued initiatives aimed
at improving patient safety. However, we strongly believe that major
gains in safety will require broad adoption of concepts from NAT.5
Normal Accident Theory
Substantialworkinnon–healthcaresettingshasbeenperformedtobet-
ter understand the causes of errors and investigate potential mitigation
strategies. One of the nation’s leading theorists in the area of safety, Dr
Charles Perrow,5 has developed NAT, a framework for analyzing failure
potentialwithinandbetweensystems.Hearguesthaterrors insystems
occur often and are indeed expected as part of normal operations. He
Concerns for patient safety persist in clinical oncology. Within several nonmedical areas
(eg, aviation, nuclear power), concepts from Normal Accident Theory (NAT), a framework for
analyzing failure potential within and between systems, have been successfully applied to
better understand system performance and improve system safety. Clinical oncology practice
is interprofessional and interdisciplinary, and our therapies often have narrow therapeutic
windows. Thus, many of our processes are, in NAT terms, interactively complex and tightly
coupled within and across systems and are therefore prone to unexpected behaviors that can
result in substantial patient harm. To improve safety at the University of North Carolina, we
have applied the concepts of NAT to our practice to better understand our systems’ behavior
and adopted strategies to reduce complexity and coupling. Furthermore, recognizing that we
cannot eliminate all risks, we have stressed safety mindfulness among our staff to further
promote safety. Many specific examples are provided herein. The lessons from NAT are
translatable to clinical oncology and may help to promote safety.
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categorizes systems based on how these errors propagate and inter-
act within the larger system. Systems in which failures propagate and
interact predictably are considered linear, and those in which failures
behave unpredictably are interactively complex.
He further categorizes systems by their ability to detect and re-
spond to failures. Systems that are relatively slow allowing rela-
tively more opportunity to detect and respond to failures are termed
loosely coupled, while those that are fast offering less opportunity
to detect and respond to failures are termed tightly coupled.
For example, the US Post Office system is linear (errors have pre-
dictable consequences) and is loosely coupled (errors are largely de-
tected and corrected, and most of the mail ultimately gets delivered).
A dammed river system is also linear but is tightly coupled. A dam
breach will often lead to a flood because the time scale for fixing the
breachistoolongtomitigatetherapiddownstreameffects.Auniversity
is interactively complex because events occurring within its many var-
ied components (eg, multiple departments, schools, social events, ath-
letics) can interact in unforeseen ways (Figure 1).19
Perrow5 argues that systems that are both interactively complex
and tightly coupled have a particular propensity for catastrophic fail-
ure. Since errors in subsystems are assuredly going to occur, and since
thesewillpropagateinunforeseenwaysthatcannotbefullyunderstood
or mitigated, major global system failures are probable. In other
words, complex systems cannot be fully understood, and thus their be-
havior will always have some element of chaos. He argues that only a
change in their structure—reducing coupling or reducing interactive
complexity—can reduce the probability of a catastrophic event.
Where does clinical oncology lie in the NAT construct? We submit
that clinical oncology practice is a relatively complex system (Figure 1).
Mostpatientsrequiremultidisciplinarycareinvolvingnumerousdiverse
specialists and care givers (eg, surgical, medical, and radiation oncolo-
gists; nurses; social workers), often with multiple care transitions (eg,
from one physician office to another and from outpatient to inpatient
settings). Thus, the number of handoffs, interactions, and unforeseen
interactions can be high, each carrying with it the potential for error.
Furthermore, the interconnected nature of much of oncology practice
tends to propagate individual errors, and interactions between mul-
tiple errors through the system and to the patient (eg, how a radiolo-
gist obtains or reviews images can affect a surgical decision, which can
affect a pathologic assessment, which can alter a treatment decision).
Allofthesecomplexitiesmeanthat it isfrequentlydifficulttoknowhow
errors will propagate through the system.
Clinical oncology processes have variable degrees of coupling.
When treatment must be delivered quickly (eg, acute leukemic cri-
sis), coupling can be tight, and errors can rapidly reach the patient.
Even if the pace of care is slow (eg, outpatient hospice care), pro-
cesses without routine downstream safety checks may still enable
errors (and unforeseen interactions between errors) to reach the pa-
tient. On the other hand, the multidisciplinary nature of oncology
may reduce coupling. For example, typically several clinicians will re-
view the same set of images or reports; cases are discussed in tu-
mor boards with multiple attendees; and multiple clinicians per-
form the same history and physical examination. Thus, there are
often opportunities for upstream errors to be mitigated, and un-
foreseen interactions within the complex systems might be de-
tected by the diverse types of people involved in the processes.20
Based on these considerations, we have categorized a number of
oncology processes as examples of the application of NAT (Figure 1).
Different quality-assurance strategies are more or less effective
for systems with different levels of complexity and coupling. For ex-
ample, people working in systems that are linear and tightly coupled
(upper left quadrant in Figure 1) must strictly adhere to processes, and
there should be frequent monitoring of key system performance met-
rics (ideally automatically). The same is true for systems that are in-
teractively complex and tightly coupled (upper right quadrant in
Figure 1), but here the monitoring of performance measures should
be comprehensive (since the manner in which the system will fail can-
not be predicted). In loosely coupled systems, the monitoring can be
less frequent, people-based monitoring (eg, peer review).
The terms quality and safety are not rigorously defined and
hence require clarification for our purposes. Safety often refers to
the avoidance of catastrophic failures (eg, death or serious injury from
a medication misadministration), and quality is often used more
broadly (eg, patient satisfaction scores, wait times in clinics). How-
ever, there is clearly a continuum, and the distinction between safety
and quality (particularly in medicine) is often indistinct. Most medi-
cal errors do not cause fatality or serious injury, but the factors that
determine whether a fatality or serious injury occurs can be unpre-
dictable. The distinction between safety and quality is particularly
blurry in interactively complex systems where seemingly minor qual-
ity issues can interact in unforeseen ways resulting in safety issues.
We submit that this is the case in much of medicine (particularly in
oncology), and thus safety and quality initiatives are inherently linked.
NAT Concept Applications and Improved Patient
Safety in Clinical Oncology at UNC
Nomenclature
Interactive complexity is reduced by promoting desired processes (and
reducing process variation) by, in order of efficacy, automation, forc-
ing functions (ie, hard stops), and standardization. This approach is es-
pecially useful in tightly coupled, interactively complex processes, but
should be effective in all processes. A straightforward example from
radiation treatment planning is nomenclature. During radiation treat-
ment planning, alternative beams and plans are considered and com-
pared. Without a naming convention, it can become difficult to keep
track of the alternatives, and occasionally an incorrect beam or plan
At a Glance
• Normal Accident Theory (NAT), a framework for analyzing failure
potential within and between systems, can be successfully
applied to clinical oncology to better understand system
performance and improve patient safety.
• Many processes in clinical oncology are, in NAT terms,
interactively complex and tightly coupled, a combination that
inevitably results in errors leading to patient harm.
• Safety initiatives should be designed to reduce complexity and
coupling of clinical oncology processes.
• Strategies of automation, forcing functions (ie, hard stops),
standardization, and monitoring of system performance
(incident learning systems, peer review) can reduce complexity
and coupling.
• The practice of clinical oncology may never be error free;
a global strategy to promote patient safety is to develop safety
mindfulness among clinical oncology health care workers.
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might propagate through the process potentially causing errors. At
UNC, we have modified our software such that beams and plans are
automaticallygivenunambiguousnames(eg,basedonorientation,cre-
ator’s name, date and time).21 Additional descriptors can be added to
the name as desired.
Standardized Communication
Another example from radiation treatment planning is our “3 Ps” sys-
tem for communicating vital patient information radiation plan-
ning directives. During radiation treatment planning, it is impor-
tant to know and communicate with other care givers whether the
patient is pregnant (P1), has a pacemaker (P2), or has received prior
irradiation (P3). Failure to consider these factors may have severe
consequences (particularly the prior radiation). Similarly, clinicians
need to communicate their goals (eg, patient positioning, treat-
ment start date, dose and volume goals). We have defined a single
location within our Mosaiq radiation therapy electronic health rec-
ord (Elekta AB) where clinicians convey this information in a con-
sistent location and format. Staff are empowered (supported by the
chairperson) to “stop the line” (ie, hard stop—not proceed with simu-
lation or planning) if these items are unaddressed. Prior to institut-
ing this approach, we had more variation in communication (eg, tele-
phone message, text page, email, sticky note, verbal exchange), more
chaos, more rework, and more events with potential patient harm.
The standardized means of electronic communication are in-
tended to complement, and not replace, face-to-face discussions.
The importance of using this standard process is reinforced in our
daily morning departmental huddle.
For purposes of standardized communications, we distinguish be-
tweenprocessesandmedicaldecisions.Forexample,onewantstostan-
dardize how a medical oncologist communicates the chemotherapy
treatment plan to the infusion nurse. This is distinctly separate from the
medical decision as to the optimal chemotherapeutic agent to use. The
processes are easier to standardize because they are more readily ac-
cepted by clinicians. There is certainly also some utility in standardiz-
ingsomemedicaldecisionstostandardizeworkflow.However,forboth
the processes and medical decisions, there must be some flexibility,
whichiseasiertoconceptualizeformedicaldecisions.Thus,wesuggest
that standardization initiatives focus initially largely on processes.
Standardized Treatment Plan Evaluation
Review of dosimetric parameters within a radiation treatment plan can
be cumbersome and perhaps haphazard: there are many images and
parameters to review. Typically, the clinician will review a dose volume
histogram, identify some critical values (eg, mean lung dose), and com-
pare these data against some standard. The comparison is often done
“in one’s head,” perhaps aided by dose limits thumbtacked to the wall.
At UNC, we have standardized the manner in which plans can be re-
viewed by creating a digital goal sheet where predetermined para-
meters from the plan are automatically compared with departmental
standards. Color coding is used to facilitate easy review of the data (eg,
parameters meeting the standards and goals are green, and those out
of range are red). Goal sheets are also helpful during peer review, and
their use enables harmonization of departmental standards and the
rapid deployment of new or modified standards (Figure 2).
Radiation treatment planning can be complicated and time-
consuming, and changes will result in replanning, reworking, and
treatment delays. Understanding that some replanning is often nec-




















Course of outpatient chemo




















The NAT concepts of linear vs interactively complex and loosely coupled vs tightly coupled are plotted in quadrants. Several nonmedical systems from Perrow’s
original descriptions (italics),5 and approximate plot locations for oncology-related activities are shown in boxes (adapted from Marks et al19). BMT indicates
bone-marrow transplant; chemo, chemotherapy; RT, radiation therapy.
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essary (eg, tumor shrinkage), our goal is to minimize the propor-
tion of replanning to 5% per month. Figure 3 shows our monthly ra-
diation treatment replanning rates. We believe that standardizing
communication of planning directives and use of the goal sheet have
reduced the radiation replanning in our department.
Standardized Perioperative Care
We recently instituted a multidisciplinary initiative called the En-
hanced Recovery After Surgery (ERAS) program to standardize pre-
operative, intraoperative, and postoperative processes for pa-
tients undergoing surgical treatment for pancreatic cancers, with
plans to implement in all major oncologic resections. This setting is
particularly fitting for such an approach because it is interactively
complex (multiple clinicians, handoffs, and care settings) and at times
tightly coupled. The ERAS program is a multimodality, periopera-
tive, evidence-based care pathway designed to achieve early recov-
ery for patients undergoing major surgery.22-24 The ERAS proto-
cols allow for standardization of care, thus accelerating recovery and
Figure 2. University of North Carolina Radiation Oncology Dosimetric Goal Sheet
Structure Result Meet Goal? N/AConstraint
PTV_SR_inskin 99.9% Yes95% of the PTV receives 100% of the Rx
XIf not, does 100% of the PTV receive ≥95% of the Rx?
100.0% Yes≥99% of the PTV receives ≥93% of the Rx
PTV_IR_inskin X95% of the PTV receives 100% of the Rx
XIf not, does 100% of the PTV receive ≥95% of the Rx?
X≥99% of the PTV receives ≥93% of the Rx
PTV_HR_inskin 94.7% No95% of the PTV receives 100% of the Rx
99.8% NoIf not, does 100% of the PTV receive ≥95% of the Rx?
100.0% Yes≥99% of the PTV receives ≥93% of the Rx
0.0% Yes≤20% of the PTV >110% of the Rx
Spinal cord+3 mm 30.03 Gy YesMax 50 Gy to point dose
Brainstem+3 mm 53.49 Gy YesMax 54 Gy to point dose
Parotid_R+3 mm 11.38 Gy YesMean dose ≤26 Gy
10.12 Gy Yes50% Receives <30 Gy
Parotid_L+3 mm XMean dose ≤26 Gy
X50% Receives <30 Gy
Larynx+3 mm 23.85 Gy YesMean dose ≤41 Gy
0.0% YesVolume receiving 60 Gy ≤24%
Cochlea_R+3 mm 44.62 Gy YesMean dose <45 Gy
Cochlea_L+3 mm 34.23 Gy YesMean dose <45 Gy
Optical chiasm+3 mm 53.20 Gy NoMax 50 Gy to point dose
Optical nerve_R+3 mm 53.20 Gy NoMax 50 Gy to point dose
Optical nerve_L+3 mm 59.75 Gy NoMax 50 Gy to point dose
Retina_R+3 mm 51.08 Gy NoMax 45 Gy to point dose
Retina_L+3 mm 60.99 Gy NoMax 45 Gy to point dose
Lens_R+3 mm 29.57 Gy NoMax 10 Gy to point dose
Lens_L+3 mm 37.94 Gy NoMax 10 Gy to point dose
Pituitary+3 mm XMean dose <45 Gy
Submandibular_R+3 mm 11.08 Gy YesMean dose <35 Gy
Submandibular_L+3 mm XMean dose <35 Gy
Oral cavity XMean dose <39 Gy
Constrictor XMean dose <50 Gy
Unspecified tissue out PTV X≤1% Receives >110% of the Rx
Body 107.1 % YesMax dose ≤110% of the Rx
The illustrated goal sheet is for a patient with head and neck cancer. The
“Result” and “Meet Goal?” columns are color coded, with red indicating that the
goal has not been met (“No”); green, that the goal has been met (“Yes”). This
sheet facilitates and standardizes plan review. Max indicates maximum;
N/A, not applicable; PTV, planning target volume; Rx, prescription.
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safety and optimizing utilization of health care resources. Multidis-
ciplinary team education (anesthesiology, surgery, and outpatient
and inpatient nursing) and timely communication were integral
throughout the process, along with early integration of patient edu-
cation to highlight the advantages of this approach.
Prior to implementation of ERAS, the perioperative processes
with the most variances included intraoperative fluid management
and perioperative pain control. The ERAS protocol has standard-
ized perioperative fluid management, with close monitoring of the
goal-directed fluid therapy delivered by the anesthesia clinicians,
and widely incorporated the use of thoracic epidural analgesia.
During the postoperative period, the nurses and patients are edu-
cated on the benefits of early mobilization, and a large portion of
the surgical care has been outlined in clinical algorithms. Our pre-
liminary results are encouraging: we have seen decreased lengths
of stay, decreased numbers of complications, decreased pain
scores, and improved patient satisfaction (as measured by Press
Ganey analytic tools). Although changes in the culture of an insti-
tution often come about slowly, processes are now being estab-
lished to sustain these NAT improvement measures throughout
the health care system.
Reducing Coupling Through Strategic Placement
of Time-Outs and Quality and Safety Checks
Peer Review and Daily Huddles
For systems that are interactively complex and tightly coupled
(upper right quadrant in Perrow’s model,5 Figure 1), the monitor-
ing of performance measures should be comprehensive because
the manner in which the system will fail cannot be predicted.
Thus, patient-specific pretreatment checks are more comprehen-
sive and include technical (eg, treatment plan quality and robust-
ness) and clinical (eg, patient’s treatment decisions, target defini-
tion, planned doses) factors. The Department of Radiation
Oncology at UNC has a long history of daily pretreatment physi-
cian peer review. This approach has been expanded to include a
broader cross-section of the department (eg, including nonphysi-
cians and students). Decisions regarding each patient are
reviewed and discussed publically, and nonphysician staff mem-
bers are encouraged to participate (eg, “Dr Marks, your target
looks tighter than your usual”).21 These sessions are conducted as
part of our broader daily huddle and are well attended (20-30
people) and viewed favorably by the vast majority of staff.21 Since
beginning the sessions, we have noted a reduction in the percent-
ages of patients needing reworking of their radiation treatment
plans.21 Similarly, we have a robust multidisciplinary tumor board
program in our cancer center (9 disease-specific meetings per
week), where most of our cases are publically discussed.
Monitoring Systems Performance
We have created detailed process flow maps (PFMs) to understand
how information is passed from one step to the next (eg, handoffs)
and where existing quality and safety checks are located. We have
also implemented a robust “good catch” incident learning system,
where workers report errors and near-errors (eg, missing or incor-
rect information, scheduling problems). By mapping the good
catches to the PFMs, we quantitatively assess where errors are de-
tected, where they originated (ie, their root causes), and the utility
of existing safety barriers. This information is used to inform im-
provement work aimed to modify processes, safety barriers, or other
practices or procedures. Between 2012 and 2014, 880 good catches
were reported, leading to 63 formal improvement activities. Typi-
cally, these events lead to changes in our processes and the elimi-

















































































































Not all components of Normal Accident Theory were implemented at the same time. Standardized communication procedures began in 2009, before any measure
illustrated on the graph; use of the goal sheet began in June 2010. There were various reasons for replanning, some of which were preventable (eg, unclear
physician directives), while others were clinically warranted (demonstrated tumor regression). Our goal was to reduce replanned treatment rates to 5% per month
or lower, understanding that some replanned treatments are always necessary.
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nation, modification, or institution of safety barriers aimed to re-
duce coupling (ie, reduce the likelihood that errors propagate).
The importance of the good catch program is recognized and
publically emphasized through many visual displays. We recently sur-
veyed all members of the UNC Department of Radiation Oncology
(71% response rate) to assess their knowledge, understanding, and
perceptions of the good catch program. Overall, 84% of respon-
dents (100% of physicians) agreed or strongly agreed that the good
catch program enhances patient safety mindfulness. Only 5% of re-
spondents reported being dissuaded by a physician, supervisor, or
peer from submitting good catches. These results suggest that the
use of an incident learning system can enhance patient safety mind-
fulness and promote a safety culture. The UNC Department of Ra-
diation Oncology’s improvement in patient safety culture is also re-
flected in our Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality patient
safety survey results (Figure 4). A similar good catch program is being
developed throughout the cancer hospital (North Caroline Cancer
Hospital), with initial efforts focused on the outpatient pediatric and
adult oncology infusion clinics.
Building Safety Mindfulness to Address Persistent
Complexity and Coupling
We recognize that we cannot fully engineer all risks out of clinical on-
cology practice. The complex nature of health care dictates that errors
and unforeseen interactions will likely still occur despite our best ef-
forts. Nevertheless, we can create systems that have some degree of
flexibility to accommodate the unexpected. Furthermore, we need
to assure that staff members have safety mindfulness—a persistent
focus on safety, a recognition that unforeseen errors will occur, and a
desire to proactively improve their systems and processes. We have
tried to create culture, environment, and infrastructure to allow all in-
dividuals (staff members and patients) to develop an understanding
of safety mindfulness and to feel comfortable in openly speaking about
errors and suboptimal systems. This is a challenge because medicine
has traditionally promoted the concept that errors are the result of
people’s individual failings3 and are associated with blame, shame, and
disciplinary actions. Dr Lucian Leape has stated that such a “climate
of blame and punishment … has been the major barrier to making prog-
ress in safety over the years.”25 We need to promote the (true) belief
that errors will occur and that they are due largely to systems’ flaws
rather than human character flaws.
Toward this goal at UNC, we have instituted several important
practices. Leaders speak often and openly about safety concerns.
They encourage, recognize, reward, and publically celebrate people
who participate in improvement work (eg, reporting good catches)
and are involved in formal improvement events (Figure 3). Also, our
decisions regarding compensation and promotion take into ac-
count the employee’s participation in quality and safety improve-
ment work. In addition, we conduct daily morning huddles, in con-
junction with our daily peer review, where we review the day’s
upcoming activities (eg, number of patients, anticipated chal-
lenges). This huddle is a consistent reminder to all that we operate
within systems that are somewhat interactively complex and coupled
and that unforeseen events can occur. Similar huddle concepts are
being applied more broadly in the North Caroline Cancer Hospital.
Leaders regularly conduct safety rounds, where they speak with
front-line workers at their worksites (eg, treatment machine, clinic)
to discuss potential safety and quality issues. At first, workers were
often reluctant to disclose their concerns for fear of blame, repri-
mands, and job security. Over time, we believe that staff members
have become more comfortable with this initiative. Since 2010, we
have had 14 safety rounds sessions, visited all workspaces, col-
lected over 200 suggestions and concerns, and provided follow-up
on most of these.
Conclusions
We have been trying to systematically apply concepts from NAT to
help us better understand how our systems behave and to imple-
ment more effective safety initiatives. During this time, we have
noted improved process measures (eg, reduced wait times, re-
duced interruptions, reduced percentage of patients requiring ra-
diation therapy replanning), improved workers’ perceptions about
quality and safety (Figure 4), and improved financial performance.
Our experiences at UNC suggest that this approach is both feasible
and useful.
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Implementation of our Normal Accident Theory interventions started in 2008
and have progressively developed to the present and are ongoing. Percentages
of positive responses in the selected 3 dimensions of patient safety culture
(organizational learning, overall perception of patient safety and quality, and
office processes and standardization) appear to have increased from 2009 to
2013 (analysis of variance P<.01). In addition, while the number of employees
did not change, the number who responded to the survey in 2013 more than
doubled from 2011, perhaps reflecting an increased respect for
quality-improvement activities. AHRQ indicates Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality.
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